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Reinventing the Drone, Reinventing
the Nav y
1919–1939
Angelina Long Callahan

I

nvention is often perceived as an isolated event, attributable to a momentous
“first” or to a single, patent-holding inventor. However, rather than questioning
what qualified as the first drone aircraft or to whom the title as its “inventor”
belongs, this article maps out the winding uncertainties of technical evolution—
exploring how seemingly failed projects laid groundwork for the U.S. Navy’s first
successful radio-controlled drone aircraft.
Situated as they are among a cluster of interwar emerging technologies, drones
provide an instructive case study through which to consider how the U.S. Navy’s
research-and-development (R&D) communities function as a strategic asset.
When the availability of one subcomponent can jeopardize an entire research
project, such factors as institutional stability, the circulation of ideas, and willingness to reevaluate naval doctrine become critical to national security. So too
does the ability of experts to recognize a (perhaps temporary) dead end when
they face one. This article will flesh out, for this case, the actors and activities
of innovation, emphasizing how the collaborative
Dr. Callahan is associate historian at the Naval Renature of this work can mitigate the uncertainties
search Laboratory, in Washington, D.C. She earned
and risks of R&D.
her doctorate in history and sociology of technology
This article is divided into five sections. The
and science at the Georgia Institute of Technology,
in Atlanta. She is a contributor to the Biographical
first is a case study of invention, recounting the
Encyclopedia of Astronomers and the Oxford Enacts of collaboration that were necessary for
cyclopedia of American Scientific, Medical, and
Technological History, and a coauthor of Palgrave’s the development of the first American radioNASA in the World: Fifty Years of International controlled aircraft. To build this prototype, the
Collaboration in Space.
electrical engineer Carlos Mirick consulted a variety of research partners, integrating cutting-edge
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instruments and subassemblies from colleagues performing R&D in Navy and
industrial laboratories and manufacturing firms.
Second, this article describes how Rear Admiral Stanford C. Hooper, often
remembered as the “father of naval radio,” administered resources and directed
research to render the high-frequency (HF) band of the electromagnetic spectrum a much more reliable operating range for radio. Facing interwar budget cuts
and losing a substantial number of naval researchers to the private sector, Hooper
labored to retain a cadre of resourceful and engaged scientists and engineers in
the early 1920s, centering them at the Naval Research Laboratory.
Building on this background, the article’s third part shows how the Naval Research Laboratory’s broad range of R&D programs and organizational stability
provided these projects with institutional continuities and connectivity to a wide
range of fleet research problems enabled the resurrection of (useful) elements
years after the cancellation of R&D projects. The fourth section describes how
elements of “failed” guided-missile projects were transferred to new lines of R&D,
yielding previously unanticipated results—bombsights, target-drone battleships,
and target-drone aircraft—all of which fostered the meticulous reevaluation of
operational and tactical doctrine by the U.S. Navy in the years leading up to the
Second World War.1
The article closes with reflections on the calls that have been prompted recently by the proliferation of drone technology among potential adversaries and
the increasing complexity of battle networks for a more centralized forum to
coordinate autonomous-systems research, development, and use.
Case Study in Invention: The Wild Goose “Flying Bomb”
Between the 1890s and World War I, the proponents of radio managed to secure
a toehold in the U.S. Navy, owing not only to the utility of the hardware but to the
fact that Great Britain and Germany were developing technical and duopolistic
leadership in the field of communications.2 In the United States during this time,
the Naval Consulting Board had identified a need for a general research center,
but the proposal had for years been mired in debate over how best to characterize the laboratory’s work.3 Would it be an “invention factory,” turning out new
prototypes for submarines and ships on a monthly basis?4 Would it engage only in
adapting commercial inventions to Navy needs, not producing, therefore, matériel
in competition with private industry? The nature of the laboratory’s work would
influence the logic of its location, another point of contention. After nearly a
decade of debate the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was founded in the Bellevue neighborhood of Washington, on the Potomac River near the southernmost
corner of the District of Columbia. NRL’s location near downtown Washington
was something of a compromise among proponents of Annapolis, Maryland, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8
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NRL, preceded by disparate and highly specialized facilities, was the first facility established to serve the research and technical needs of the entire Navy.
All photos courtesy NRL

Sandy Hook, New Jersey.5 It appealed to naval officers like Hooper, who headed
the Bureau of Engineering (BUENG) Radio Division and who also oversaw the
founding of NRL’s Radio Division, because it was conveniently accessible from
the Naval District Washington headquarters.6 It contained for the moment only
two divisions, Radio and Sound.
In a sense, the current U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) effort can be
traced to NRL’s Radio Division, which opened with just nineteen engineers
and four physicists in the spring of 1923.7 They had been brought there from
BUENG’s Radio Test Shop, the Radio Research Laboratory, the Aircraft Radio
Laboratory, and the Anacostia Naval Air Station, adjacent to the new site of
NRL. Experts and skilled shop workers at the Washington Navy Yard were also
transferred to the laboratory, as all navy yards were now to cease pursuing their
own dispersed and uncoordinated research problems. 8 Stated Rear Admiral
Stanford Hooper, “Our idea is that all research should be concentrated here
where we have employed Physicists and Radio Engineers of the highest quality.”
Significantly, he predicted that through these measures “research along various
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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lines can be thoroughly co-ordinated.”9 This coordination appealed to the Navy
Bureau of Engineering in part because bringing researchers to one centralized
facility streamlined an “unwieldy and expensive” collection of post–World War I
Navy facilities.10
Radio Division researchers reported for duty on 16 April 1923, a full three
months before NRL’s dedication and formal opening.11 Over the course of ten
days, naval air station experimenters relocated downstream from the Anacostia
River to NRL’s dock on the Potomac—loading and unloading the barge full of
equipment themselves.12 Setting up shop with “temporary wires strung here
and there” and using portable generators for power, experimenters set to work
reassembling their tools and lab equipment.13 One of many experienced and
resourceful engineers who had been circulating among communities of mechanicians and was now setting up shop at NRL was Carlos B. Mirick. With a Cornell
University degree in electrical engineering, Mirick had served as an engineer
in Washington, D.C.’s National Electrical Supply Company until World War I.
Following service as a Naval Reserve officer, he returned to the Electrical Supply Company as a vice president of engineering. Soon after, he returned to the
Navy and in 1919, the Navy’s naval air station loaned Mirick to the Air Mail Service, where he helped develop direction-finder loops for navigation and helped
develop the radio direction finder for the famed NC-4 transatlantic flight.14 In
February 1922, BUENG invited him to begin work on linking radio transmitting
stations and remotely piloted aircraft.
That winter Mirick began construction of what was to be the first American
remotely piloted aircraft, intended to be a guided bomb. He set to work in a sheetiron garage, referred to as the “longwave shack.” Lumbering about the unheated
shop in a fur-lined flying suit, he experimented with a variety of setups, working
toward a transmitter, receiver, and relay capable of controlling an aircraft from as
much as twelve miles away. Reflecting back later on his work on BUENG’s “flying bomb” project, Mirick would credit several other inventive thinkers for their
contributions. In the spring of 1922, he began a tour of military and commercial facilities, surveying various equipment and methods he might incorporate.
Among his visits was one to the Hammond Research Laboratory in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. John Hays Hammond, Jr., and his colleagues were laboring to
develop radio control for torpedoes, having recently demonstrated the efficacy
of radio control of ships.
In addition to Hammond, a renowned radio-control expert, Mirick’s project
materialized in a fascinating confluence of aviation figures and artifacts. The
N-9 seaplane Mirick was using dated back to a 1915 flying-torpedo project led
by Lawrence Burst Sperry, inventor of the Sperry gyrostabilizer. Sperry’s “unpiloted” plane differed from Mirick’s primarily in that Sperry’s had been supposed
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8
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to navigate by preset automation rather than radio control. When Sperry’s N-9
had consistently—though narrowly—missed targets, he had requested permission to use radio control to adjust for wind-induced creep. The Naval Consulting Board denied his request, although one historian asserts that postwar aerial
torpedo achievements indicate that radio signals would have effectively corrected
the flight path.15 Nevertheless, Sperry’s project was canceled. Inspiration for
Mirick’s ground-control selector switches came through “confidential channels”
late in World War I, in the form of indications that German researchers were
experimenting with a radio-controlled torpedo boat operated by a modified
remote control adapted from wireless telegraph systems. Mirick contracted with
an Illinois teletype manufacturer, the Morkrum-Kleinschmidt Company, for the
production of two eight-circuit selector switches designed to his specifications.
The Kleinschmidt switches were retrofitted into the N-9 by a then-obscure Carl
Norden at the U.S. Naval Proving Ground in Dahlgren, Virginia. Through this
cooperation the Navy capitalized on Norden’s experience as a former partner of
Elmer and Lawrence Sperry, with whom he had helped develop the first generation of gyrostabilizers for automated control of aircraft systems. Once Sperry’s
now-surplus gyrostabilized N-9 and the teletype switches were secured, as Mirick
later recalled, modestly describing his own contribution, “the next requirement
was to develop a radio link to consist of a receiver and a relay capable of actuating
this selector switch while in flight.”16
The Navy’s consolidation of researchers and resources at NRL put Mirick
in contact with a number of other experts with overlapping interests in radio.
There he completed his bench work on the project, integrating input of scientific
researchers, radio engineers, shop workers, contractors, and military specialists.
The Radio Division fostered a broad portfolio of investigations, delving into the
fields of aircraft direction finding, radio control, communications and radio
standards, instrumentation, and the fundamentals of radio-wave propagation.17
The photo on the next page shows a few of Mirick’s colleagues who frequently
consulted with him. These included A. Hoyt Taylor, Louis Gebhard, and Leo C.
Young, all of whom had worked together at the Great Lakes Naval Radio Station
during the war, where Taylor had taken on the role of supervisor and mentor to
Gebhard and Young. Years later, Gebhard would recall that Taylor (as superintendent of the NRL Radio Division) tended to think in broader, more theoretical
terms than did his colleagues, who were advancing the field at more technical
levels: “We had the ideas of how to do the things that he may not have had. I don’t
think that he had any great capability of winding a coil or anything like that. . . .
But now, he didn’t have to do it; he could let other people go ahead and do it.”18
Taylor engaged in radio-propagation experiments on a number of naval ships
and in collaboration with amateur radio operators the world over. Through these
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

5

	c a l l a ha n	
103

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 3, Art. 8

Seated (left to right): G. E. Jacobson, W. B. Burgess, R. B. Meyer, L. C. Young, A. H. Taylor, L. A. Gebhard, O. C. Dresser, T. M. Davis.
Standing: E. E. Brock, W. H. Dyer, R. J. Colson, F. W. Struthers, E. L. Powell, D. H. Ness, R. B. Owens, A. E. Meininger, J. J. MacGregor, C. B. Mirick,
A. L. Harris, J. W. Johnson.

experiments he labored meticulously to map the ionosphere’s effect on HF radiowave propagation; his early atmospheric and ionospheric studies made important
connections with HF radio tinkerers and experts who would contribute to Navy
R&D.19 Over time, Taylor increasingly devoted his energies to administration,
helping BUENG translate Navy needs into functional hardware and researchers
communicate promising new ideas to their sponsors in the Navy bureaus.20 In
these early days of HF research, Taylor and Young pitched their first proposal for
radio detection and ranging—later known by the acronym “radar.” (The proposal
was unsuccessful. Many years later, Hooper would recall that the bureau turned
it down because of problems with vacuum-tube reliability.)21
Indeed, NRL radio researchers—pioneers in the use of the more cantankerous
radio frequencies of 1,300 kilocycles and higher—made do without a number
of instruments that would be ubiquitous by the 1940s. There were no signal
generators, and there was no field-strength measuring equipment or means of
measuring radio-frequency gain (“except by methods of comparison based on
the use of a shunted telephone connected at the receiver output”).22 A colleague
working on radio transmitters would recall that though a number of items were
ordered from private industry—meters came from the meter company, relays
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from relay companies—coils and capacitors were generally made in-house, since
they demanded “special design,” project by project.23 In many cases, industrial
partners willingly adapted to NRL’s demanding specifications. Louis Gebhard, a
radio research engineer who had transferred from Marconi Wireless to the Navy
in 1917 and was to become associate superintendent of the NRL Radio Division,
later recalled the responsiveness of such firms:
We cooperated with these people and similarly when we got into quartz crystal work,
we had to have accurate temperature control. So we worked with a precision instrument
company who would provide us with thermostats and thermometers that were high
precision. We would work with them: they would bring samples down and put them in
and determine how they would work; we would make suggestions as to improvement,
24
to fit into things that we wanted to do for the Navy and quantity production.

The lack of standardized instruments and subcomponents reflects the fact
that the laboratory workers were operating on the frontiers of their field, before
mass-produced (or for that matter, entirely reliable) parts could be purchased to
fill essential needs. Working with industrial partners, NRL researchers labored
to improve the reliability of prototypes. This quality-control work, in turn, facilitated the transition to mass production of reliable parts.
NRL’s offices and workshops embodied the cutting edge of radio, in microcosm. The Aircraft Radio Group that Mirick headed was complemented by five
other Radio Division research groups covering a broad spectrum of activities,
from the most basic scientific inquiry to mission-oriented R&D and instrument
development. Any of the twenty-three Radio Division personnel could be transferred among the groups—Aircraft Radio under Carlos Mirick, the Transmitter
Group under Louis Gebhard, General Research under Leo Young, Direction Finders under Warren B. Burgess, Receivers under Thomas M. Davis, and the Precision Measurement Group under the physicist John M. Miller. In Mirick’s opinion,
“the best feature” of the radio-control equipment of his N-9, which he dubbed
Wild Goose, was a much-needed six-stage, choke-coupled radio-frequency
amplifier, designed and built under the direction of Dr. Miller.25 (Miller, also
credited with contributing to Mirick’s receiver, would spend much of his career
developing the piezoelectric crystal hardware and theory necessary to standardize and measure HF radio.)26
Mirick later reported, with no hint of embarrassment, that all materials but the
vacuum tubes, Miller’s amplifier, and the Morkrum telegraph selectors had been
salvaged from “old and condemned radio sets.”27 For this purpose he undoubtedly made use of NRL’s surplus machinery dump—an agglomeration of some
three dozen railroad cars full of surplus radio equipment, tools, cables, wire, and
scrap metal. Years later Taylor recalled how “during the lean and hungry days of

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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the middle and late ’twenties the dump turned out to be a godsend to the Laboratory.” In fact, “it was no uncommon sight to see two or three engineers poking
around through this pile looking for some usable item.” Of course, the dump was
not without its problems—in summertime the piles of rusting machinery among
sprouting weeds and wildflowers proved hospitable for rattlesnakes.28
Establishing an effective radio link between the ground station and the aircraft
controls was not just a matter of digging spare parts out of the NRL dump and
cobbling them together with Miller’s amplifier and contractor-supplied switches.
There was the work of actually retrofitting the radio-control system to the seaplane.29 Beyond that, integrating radio control required careful monitoring of
instrument weights, equipment dimensions, and electrical demands. Planes at
that time had no power supplies for auxiliary electrical instruments, so Mirick’s
radio equipment had to include its own.
But how to test a radio-controlled seaplane? Chief Radioman Elmer Luke was
assigned to pilot the craft remotely, from its ground station, and Lieutenant John
Jennings Ballentine, officer in charge of the proving ground’s naval air detail,
handled in-flight backup. Between 25 July and 15 September 1924, the collaborators flew the Wild Goose a number of times, experimenting with varying degrees
of remote control.30 During these test flights Ballentine, a pilot, rode on board,
monitoring specially designed lights to assure himself that radio commands were
coming through, prepared to intercede manually if radio communication failed.
In the course of these test flights the team determined that Mirick’s radio setup
was transmitting and accepting commands adequately but that the system had
disconcerting limitations. The Morkrum selector switch functioned to specifications, but, “like a one-armed paper hanger,” Mirick worried, “it could do but
one thing at a time.”31 It could turn right, turn left, raise the elevator, lower the
elevator, throttle on, or throttle off—but only sequentially. The aircraft could not
be made, for instance, to turn and bank, or descend and reduce throttle, at the
same time. That summer, Mirick decided to make a selector of his own design,
one that would permit concurrent commands and operation that more closely
resembled piloted flight.
Carlos Mirick knew of a gentleman in Springfield, Ohio, who was working on
a relay capable of controlling multiple branch circuits at once. But it proved too
large to be adapted to the N-9, and Mirick and Chief Luke set about miniaturizing
the system. “Working on similar lines” to the Ohio relay, they mounted tuned steel
reeds (not unlike tuning-fork tines) in an old watch-case telephone receiver.32
The unit’s four circuits permitted fewer operations (forward and reverse, right
turn and left turn) than the Morkrum switch, but they did make simultaneous
commands possible on a wheeled joystick-controlled prototype.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8
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In redesigning the relay, Mirick adapted the interface from switches to an aircraft’s control stick the size of a pencil. Before they could test the preliminary system on an aircraft, Mirick and Luke fabricated a battery-powered, three-wheeled
cart. Turning again to cannibalized parts, they even pilfered a front wheel from
the “velocipede” of Luke’s young child Robert.33 In his September 1923 patent application for an “Electrical Distant-Control System,” Mirick explained that since
its operation was “identical with the ‘joy stick’ provided in aircraft for controlling the machine,” this new device was “particularly applicable in maneuvering
aircraft without a pilot. . . . [A]n operator at the radio transmitter at a shore station who is an experienced aviator may therefore move the lever . . . in the same
manner in which he is accustomed to operating the ‘joy stick’ in aircraft.”34 The
joystick controls could not be developed and adapted to the Wild Goose in time
for its test program; it would have greatly increased the safety of operation for
the backup pilot, whose life depended on the craft’s (and radio controller’s) performance.35 Several times during the test flights the N-9’s control gear malfunctioned, sending the plane into dangerous spins. Given this touchy performance of
the Wild Goose, each time Ballentine rode as backup operator of the experimental
craft he risked becoming one of many Navy pilots and experimenters killed in
interwar aviation R&D.
On 15 September 1924, the N-9 flew its first and last truly remotely piloted
mission, with only a sandbag (for weight) belted into the pilot’s seat. Because
Dahlgren personnel had expressed concern that a radio-controlled craft might
“get out of control or crack up over land,” threatening buildings and personnel,
Lieutenant Ballentine devised a safety measure: his assistant aviation officer,
Lieutenant J. E. Ostrander, “took off gallantly in a galloping D.H. [de Havilland]
land plane,” armed with bricks and ready to throw them at the Wild Goose’s propellers, thus downing it without using live ammunition.
Overall, the radio equipment performed quite well, except for a couple of moments when the control “seemed to stick.” At one point, when the seaplane failed
to respond to repeated right-turn commands and lost considerable altitude, the
operators cut the throttle and decided to land it on the Potomac. Seeing that it
was too late for a safe landing, they opened the throttle again, hoping to make
a second attempt. However, the command took effect too late, and the plane’s
pontoons struck the water with great force. In his report Ballentine stated that
the plane rose again approximately fifty feet, then made a satisfactory landing.
However, unbeknownst to its operators, one of the aging pontoons had cracked,
and it now took on water, causing the plane to sink after an otherwise successful flight. Ballentine speculated that a newer pontoon would have absorbed the
shock of the first touchdown, given the fact that the radio-control equipment remained intact. More important, Ballentine and Mirick agreed, what was required
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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was development of a more refined form of control, such as the joystick.36 Wild
Goose having sunk in the Potomac, damaging its electronics beyond repair, it was
not until 11 December 1925 that the collaborators could make a second attempt,
with new plane and electrical equipment. Unfortunately, the second plane too was
lost, when it porpoised excessively on takeoff.37 Funding for the “flying bomb”
stopped that year.
Had it all come to naught?
“Hipped on HF”: BUENG Cultivates Communities of
Innovation
As illustrated above, Mirick and his colleagues operated on the cusp between the
known and unknown. In spite of its yet unpredictable nature, HF radio required
the least electrical power, its systems were the lightest, and its antennae the shortest (as was evidenced in those days by the two radio towers, one 430 feet high and
one six hundred feet, looming over Arlington Cemetery’s low-frequency station
for transatlantic communication).38 Thus, aviation remained one of the critical
applications driving researchers to pioneer the high frequencies for communication, navigation, and, for some, radio guidance.
Before and after he secured resources to support the Radio Division at NRL,
Stanford Hooper kept abreast of and even publicized Navy experimentation and
achievements in HF radio. Information for HF radio inventors, tinkerers, and
users circulated in the BUENG Monthly Radio and Sound Report, the Proceedings of the International Radio Engineers (IRE), magazines such as Radio News (in
which the Navy briefly secured a page each month for the service’s radio news
and pictures), the American Radio League’s QST (the traditional brevity code
for “calling all stations”), and Popular Radio (in which Hooper also published).39
Indeed, “amateur” implied not so much “not professional” as the use of frequencies deemed too high to be reliable for service use. Today, “high frequency”
radio is defined as beginning at three megahertz—or three thousand kilocycles
per second (kcs), in the parlance of the 1920s. Mirick’s superintendent, Taylor,
and his contemporaries, however, considered “high frequencies” as beginning
where medium-frequency waves began exhibiting the unpredictability of the
ionospheric skip-distance effect—starting between 1,300 and 1,500 kcs. Thus,
when Hooper relied on “amateur” radio operators to aid in his experiments, he
engaged a broad spectrum of people, ranging from leisure-time ham radio operators to university professors.
The career of Hoyt Taylor, indeed, illustrates the permeability of seemingly
distinct fields of radio: academic, hobbyist, and naval. In 1916 Taylor, then a
physics professor at the University of North Dakota, submitted a paper to the
IRE Proceedings concerning radio receiving systems. It described the potential
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8

10

1 0 8 	nava l wa r c o l l e g e r e v i e w

Callahan: Reinventing the Drone, Reinventing the Navy1919–1939

of concealing a radio antenna underground—an idea that, unbeknownst to him,
was being pursued by the Navy in a classified project, under contract. The Navy,
learning of the manuscript, asked Taylor to retract it; he responded graciously
with “a very fine patriotic letter stating that he was very glad not to publish the
article, that he was very happy to be able to cooperate with the Navy,” and offering
his assistance if needed in the future.40
In time, BUENG’s Radio Division, under Stanford Hooper, discovered that
its contractor working on a radio direction finder “could make it work but he
couldn’t explain how it worked. . . . [O]f course, I [Hooper] couldn’t understand
how it worked and neither could Mr. Clark of the [Engineering] Bureau.”41 Hoo
per wrote Taylor asking him to undertake the task of discovering the scientific
principles by which the radio direction finder operated. Taylor accepted. Three
years and a world war passed before Taylor’s paper on the subject was published
in IRE’s June 1919 Proceedings. In the meantime, the professor found himself
drawn into the war effort, first as a civilian and then, in the Naval Reserve, as
district communication officer of the Great Lakes Training Station, then commanding officer of the Navy receiving and control center at Belmar, New Jersey,
supervising the transatlantic network. After the war he went on to lead the
Hampton Roads Air Station Experimental Division and finally to head the Naval
Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Anacostia Naval Air Station (whence he was transferred to NRL).
The multiform careers of Taylor, Mirick, Luke, and Miller show that though
it is tempting to classify radio experts of that era as products of either industry,
the Navy, or academia, these individuals commonly passed among two of these
communities or more. Mirick’s career demonstrates the permeability of these
fields, by which winding chains of innovations were fostered, with devisers of
cutting-edge ideas producing novel systems based on experiences of colleagues
in other fields. As people moved, so too did their ideas.42
Just as the pool of Navy-supported radio experts was reduced to meet shrinking postwar budgets, the world of amateur radio was taking off, with a growing
number of users spending an increasing amount of money on ham radio sets
and parts. In 1922 alone, the American radio industry was worth about sixty
million dollars (in 1922 dollars—about $813 million today).43 Stanford Hooper’s
archived papers are interspersed with more than a dozen letters from colleagues
and naval subordinates bidding farewell as they accepted positions in RCA, Marconi, and many smaller radio firms.44 On one hand, private industry functioned
as an alternate career path where the Navy’s innovative thinkers could build
constituencies in private industry or weather interwar reductions in force. But
on the other hand, Hooper and Taylor were left struggling to retain their choice
research corps. By the time NRL began coming together in 1922, Hooper, its
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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BUENG proponent, had seen to it that the facility would possess a staff that was
well qualified, if—as was characteristic of the interwar Navy—undermanned and
underfunded.
NRL administrators grappled with what seemed to them limitless research
problems and at the same time inexorable cuts to salaries, travel funding, and
matériel. In June 1923, as the laboratory was still tooling up, Edgar G. Oberlin,
its director, and Taylor wrote the head of the Bureau of Engineering outlining
the nineteen research problems that would guide NRL’s radio work. Of these, one
alone was “almost sufficient in scope to tie up every man in the laboratory who
knows anything about tube transmitters.” They reported that no one was available
to be assigned to six of the research problems.45
In the face of resource limitations, many questioned the prudence of devoting researchers to the uncertain field of HF at all. Throughout the early and
mid-1920s the Navy researchers’ advance into the HF spectrum was met with
resistance from naval officers worried that people who were in one officer’s words
“hipped on HF” might be leaping too quickly into an unproven field. From their
perspective, these frequencies demanded too much money and occupied too
much of NRL’s time. “I have to keep my eyes [figuratively] on the ground,” explained one critic, convinced that work in HF would come at the expense of improvements to more reliable communications technologies already in the fleet.46
Hooper, who had faced similar resistance with the adoption of lower-frequency
radio at the turn of the century, believed that making Navy users more knowledgeable would facilitate modernization. Thus, from the first a radio school
was colocated at NRL. In February 1925, as BUENG was building up to routine
operation in the high-frequency spectrum, Hooper wrote Taylor of his hope that
a constituency of radio operators could be built who were not only open to the
improvement of their hardware but willing to collaborate in its systematic “reinvention.” Hooper and Oberlin agreed that the school’s physical and intellectual
proximity to the cutting edge of radio research would enrich the students’ training. With an understanding of the adaptability of HF radio to needs of the Navy,
fleet radio officers would be able to “make intelligent recommendations” that
would “fit with those in Washington.” Hooper intimated, “It has always been my
experience that the Fleet lagged way behind the Research Staff in recommendations, because of lack of knowledge as to what could be done.” This disconnect,
he knew, could delay the approval of new equipment for years.47
By 1927, one of Taylor’s amateur collaborators temporarily employed by the
Navy and soon to return to the private sector reported to readers of the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings that “high frequency radio is in the Navy to stay. It
is surpassing any other form of radio by leaps and bounds. . . . With apparatus
occupying only a tiny amount of space, as compared to the ancient arc[,] . . . the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8
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ships of the fleet are maintaining direct contact with Washington over distances
practically impossible on low frequency and with infinitely less power.”48 Such
advancements in hardware and human resources would buttress the reliability
and performance of NRL’s next generations of radio control.
Radio and 1930s Modernization: The Promise and
Threat of Airpower
For ten years, plans for a remotely controlled “flying bomb” lay dormant in
BUENG and the Bureau of Ordnance (BUORD). However, Mirick and his group
at NRL remained anything but inactive. In spite of the Wild Goose’s apparent dead
end, NRL retained the plans for radio-control equipment and adapted it to ostensibly unrelated undertakings by other groups. The most immediate beneficiary,
Carl Norden, used Mirick’s system to synchronize the release of bombs, testing
and calibrating experimental bombsights in the late 1920s.49 Working alongside
Dahlgren engineers, Norden developed a mechanical system to render bomb trajectories more predictable and effective. This preliminary research led eventually
to the famous Norden bombsight.
While the efficacy of the Norden bombsight remains disputed, perhaps the
most rewarding return on Mirick’s radio-control system was in gradually “unmanning” targets, making it possible for ships, aircraft, and submarines to attack
realistically maneuvering targets with minimal risk to Navy personnel. In 1930
Mirick personally oversaw the installation of his sequential radio controls on
board the destroyer Stoddert (DD 302) and in 1932 on the converted battleship
Utah (AG 16, originally BB 31). These ships served as test beds for three and
nine years, respectively, proving worthy quarries for surface ships, submarines,
and aircraft. Personnel who would otherwise have been exposed to great danger
on the bridge operated the craft from a safe distance (though skeleton crews often remained below deck on ships). Thus, the ships could imitate the speed and
evasive maneuvers of a well-commanded ship under attack, with minimal risk.50
Radio controls intended for Mirick’s “flying bomb” were thus transferred
to new communities, where they were used to refine operating procedures for
the Navy’s oldest and newest equipment. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers
practiced long-range firing on drone-towed target rafts. Submariners stalked
and fired on surface targets. Naval aviators used drone target ships to develop
tactics for dive-, torpedo, and high-level bombing. This was to prove a critical
time in the Navy’s development of carrier techniques and doctrine, in terms of
both interservice rivalry and heightening international tensions.51 Thus, it may
be that the twilight years of Stoddert, Utah, and other ships used in similar ways
were their most historically significant. Stoddert, operating in the Mobile Target
Division 1 out of San Diego, helped train aviators assigned to Saratoga (CV 3),
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NRL’s second generation of aviation radio control was first tested on 19 November 1937. Less than a year later, NRL’s system provided guidance for the
nation’s first maneuverable aerial target.

the second American ship originally commissioned as an aircraft carrier.52 In the
increasingly tense years of the late 1930s, Utah towed targets for battle practice,
provided mobile target services to submarines, and served as a mobile target for
Patrol Wing 1, as well as for attack aircraft based on the carriers Lexington (CV
2), Saratoga, and Enterprise (CV 6).
Throughout the 1930s and even into the 1940s, Navy commanders employed
NRL radio controls in intensive field trials—both on the sea and on the wing.
Yet all the while the laboratory’s research in remote control remained a work in
progress. As something of a prototype, Stoddert eased the transition to the next
generations of radio-controlled target ships, including Boggs (DE 136), Lamberton (DD 119), and Utah. When not under radio control as a target, Utah served
as a fleet machine gunners’ school; in 1938, Utah gun crews practiced firing on
remotely piloted N2C-2 aircraft simulating dive-bombing attacks. Radio control
for these aircraft—descendants of Mirick’s Wild Goose—had been designed by
NRL’s Radio Division.
Reinventing the Navy: N2C-2 Drones
It was not until the failure of the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935–36
that the paths of the Naval Aircraft Factory, NRL, the Bureau of Aeronautics
(BUAER), BUORD, and BUENG converged in pursuit of a field-ready and massproducible target drone. When the Japanese delegates walked out of the London
conference, fifteen years of voluntary arms limitations among the U.S., British,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8

14

1 1 2 	nava l wa r c o l l e g e r e v i e w

Callahan: Reinventing the Drone, Reinventing the Navy1919–1939

Japanese, Italian, and French navies ended; a naval race seemed unavoidable and
war probable. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W. H. Standley, who
had attended the conference, returned home determined to revive radio-control
research, this time for target aircraft. War production was imminent, and drones
would not only aid in the training of sailors and pilots but help Navy leadership
evaluate current antiaircraft practice.
The systems that resulted could be identified as the first drones, not because
they were the first remotely piloted aircraft (they were not), but because these
were the first remotely piloted aircraft given that name. The name was likely
suggested by NRL’s Hoyt Taylor, who was confident that “to those who know
anything about honey bees, the significance of the term will be clear. The drone
has one happy flight and then dies.”53 While in the United Kingdom, Standley
had observed demonstrations of target planes operating under the Queen Bee
program; he returned declaring that an urgent need for targets demanded that
researchers push development and experimentation to the very limit.54 Many
viewed the exercises that would then be conducted not simply as tests of the skills
of gunners but as a way to settle a dispute between BUAER and BUORD regarding the overall efficacy of antiaircraft weapons. For its part, BUENG, as home of
the Navy radio research, expressed its “keen desire to handle the development of
the radio equipment.”55
BUAER, meanwhile, searched for an aviator qualified in aerodynamics and capable of supervising the radio equipment R&D. In July 1936 it selected Lieutenant
Commander Delmar S. Fahrney. Just as Mirick had surveyed the state of the art
in 1922, Fahrney was instructed to engage in a comprehensive study of previous
projects in radio control.56 Assigning the project maximum priority, BUENG
placed NRL in charge of radio control, working with the engineering group at the
Naval Aircraft Factory. In a continuity that undoubtedly saved time and money,
former chief radioman Elmer Luke returned to work full-time on radio control,
this time as a civilian researcher improving an oscillating-reed circuit recognized
by all parties as based on a principle that had been engineered into a workable
system under the guidance of Hoyt Taylor, Carlos Mirick, Leo Young, and Matthew Schrenk in the 1920s. More than fifteen years after Mirick had begun the
first round of work, NRL’s radio engineers improved on his electromechanical
airfoil controls, making them reliable enough for the simultaneous operation of
multiple functions.
Demonstrations held on 17 February 1937 succeeded, with the “mother plane”
twenty-five miles from the drone. The filter managed to segregate signals for
aileron, elevator, throttle, and autopilot using a magnetically driven reed to vary
magnetic flux through a coupled coil, thus averting complications experienced
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with Mirick’s earlier filter, which had used a vibrating contactor. Whereas Mirick
exercised resourcefulness in securing custom-made switches, relays, amplifiers,
and the like for his N-9 HF equipment, an NRL report observes that the N2C-2
project had been bequeathed over the previous decade “comparatively sturdy
and dependable high-frequency units used as standard equipment. . . . With more
reliable sending and receiving equipment the prospects for success were greatly
enhanced.”57 High-frequency radio was coming into its own, with standardized
and mass-producible assemblies and parts.
Lieutenant Commander Fahrney, who had been the chief inspector of the
Naval Aircraft Factory before becoming the officer in charge of the drone program, proved a valuable partner to NRL. In hindsight, Taylor felt, “One reason
that progress for this problem in earlier days [i.e., Mirick’s “flying bomb”] had
not been more rapid was because no strong high level of coordination had been
applied to it. Captain Fahrney supplied this in an admirable fashion.”58 Once
made rugged, reliable, and affordable, HF radio control could be “black-boxed”
and applied to fleet exercises. Thus the radio-controlled drone, once the subject
of Mirick’s R&D, became a diagnostic tool in and of itself.
The results of this drone development, known as Special Project D, proved
heartening to the radio researchers but generated data that appalled naval commanders preparing for a probable war. In 1938, the chief of BUAER sent congratulations to the chief of BUENG on the performance of NRL equipment in drone
tests. He reported with pleasure that in 187 flying hours under radio control,
few failures had occurred. This reliability he attributed to the vision, technical
judgment, and directive ability of NRL scientists and engineers. The ability to
“unman” aircraft in field test demonstrations revealed that neither antiaircraft
(AA) gunners nor their equipment was performing to satisfaction. In the spring
of 1939, multiple drone-target runs on the destroyers USS Patterson (DD 392)
and Reid (DD 369) and the battleship Idaho (BB 42) produced but a dozen or so
bullet holes and no drone kills. Taylor later recalled that “it was quite a while before one of these targets was brought down by a Naval gunner”; in the meantime
much troubleshooting ensued, reshaping antiaircraft doctrine for years to come.59
In August 1938, N2C-2 drones made scheduled runs over the carrier Ranger
(CV 4). Its gun crews, well trained by the standards of those days, failed to score
a single hit. In September 1939, Utah expended 1,500 rounds from its 1.1-inch
batteries against nine dive-bombing “attacks” without downing a drone. NRL’s
Louis Gebhard would recall, “The rapid increase in the use of drones quickly
revealed the inadequacy of our antiaircraft defense against maneuvered targets
and led to more rapid improvement of our fire-control systems.”60 But ultimately,
as Admiral Claude C. Bloch, then Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, stated, “The
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firings against radio-controlled target airplanes have proved of inestimable value
in testing the efficiency of the antiaircraft defense of the Fleet and in determining
the procedures which should be used to make antiaircraft fire most effective.”61
Between 1939, when a drone services group was formed, and the fall of 1940,
gunners began scoring more hits, learning how resilient aircraft were against AA
weaponry and, again, showing what Navy leadership could anticipate in battle.
In spring 1940, the Secretary of the Navy designated Rear Admiral Ernest Joseph
King to make a special study for the improvement of antiaircraft batteries. That
August, the Chief of Naval Operations created the Navy Department Antiaircraft
Defense (“King”) Board to study options for improving antiaircraft batteries.
Ultimately, the target drone trials led to a number of fleet adaptations.62 By December the King Board had declared that the Navy’s lack of close-range AA gun
defense constituted the “most serious weakness in the readiness of the Navy for
war.”63 In this way drone tests led to demands for improved optical fire-control
systems, encouraged the installation of radar fire control on ships, aided in development of proximity fuses for AA guns, and finally, made it clear that gunners
needed more training and longer assignments to that specialty. Through the early
years of World War II, demand for drones rose steadily. The Navy soon exceeded
its supply of surplus military aircraft and began procuring small commercial
planes to use as targets—twenty a month in 1942, then sixty, and finally eighty a
month in 1943, by which time the U.S. Army and the Royal Navy had begun placing orders too.64 Through the end of the Second World War, drones continued
to be employed in gunnery training; radio control was installed in F6F aircraft
to simulate kamikaze attacks. In 1946, radio-controlled F6Fs were transported to
Bikini Atoll to monitor and evaluate a whole new weapon—the atomic bomb.65
Yesterday and Today: Lessons for Maintaining the
Strategic Edge
This interwar case study offers six lessons for thinking about research and development today. The point is not to claim that U.S. drones were invented by NRL researchers, in isolation. They were not. NRL was but one institution through which
the Navy advanced its stake in the fast-developing radio age. There, researchers
adapted innovative ideas from across the United States and abroad to Navy needs;
they worked to forecast plausible capabilities of the U.S. Navy and potential adversaries; and they kept on hand experts to aid in matters ranging from patent disputes with private industry to emergency R&D, such as Project D. What matters
here are the difficult decisions faced by researchers, their administrators, Navy
sponsors, and collaborators operating at the cutting edge of radio R&D.
For the world’s navies, the interwar period was a time of intense scrutiny, from
naval leadership, citizens, budget makers, and potential adversaries. Because of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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its response to this interwar scrutiny—testing, evaluating, and rethinking the
role of old and new battle platforms—when the “sleeping giant” was awakened
in December 1941, the U.S. Navy bore little resemblance to the Navy of 1919.
Historians have observed that the interwar Navy, constrained as it was by postwar
drawdowns, Depression-era budgets, and disarmament agreements, “fostered an
innovative spirit among American admirals that made them better able to fight
the Pacific war.”66 Yet it is critical to note that it was by no means the treaty limitations, fiscal conservatism, or interservice rivalries that facilitated innovation.
Instead, these conditions shaped the political economy in which naval administrators, researchers, and engineers operated, a setting that occasionally made
them more amenable to technological change.
The first lesson arises from the fact that during this time engineers invented
neither submarines, nor aircraft, nor HF radio. Instead, military and civilian
experts spent the interwar decades methodically testing the efficacy of those
technologies in laboratory and field trials and weighing plausible adjustments to
preexisting systems. It took a tremendous amount of work in a number of institutions to bring research to the point of producing prototypes, and then effective
operational systems. But ultimately, these years of exploratory HF-radio R&D
laid a foundation on which Navy researchers and their industrial partners were
to build for decades.
Second, the field of radio is big and still growing. Like aviation and space, it is
defined as much by the fundamental properties of a medium as by the technologies and countermeasures necessary for operation therein. From 1924 to 2014,
drones have represented only one platform in a rich field of promising technologies at the cutting edge of research. As illustrated by the case of Carlos Mirick, at
this epistemic edge critical breakthroughs commonly result from tracking down
and integrating tools and insights from complementary fields, be the source a
division down the hall or a manufacturer in another country. Such interactions
remain necessary conditions for revolutionary innovations as well as incremental
adaptations.
Third, for many, natural and man-made vagaries of the electromagnetic spectrum do not matter until they impede operations; such impediments are often
stumbled on, though sometimes they are anticipated. Similarly, good ideas may
circulate by chance, or they may be preemptively cultivated. A recent study analyzed the origins of the aircraft carrier angled flight deck.67 One of its findings
was a disconnect between the U.S. Navy’s aviators, who recognized the utility of
deck-edge aircraft carriers as used by the Royal Navy (RN), and the Navy’s technical specialists: “There was plenty of talent available to both navies, but having
the right individuals in the right place at the right time is often a matter of chance,
and chance favored the RN.”
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/8
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In fact, administrators like Hooper and Taylor did accept that some variables
must inevitably be left to chance. It was not simply the invention of radio control
that aided the Navy in those interwar years of testing, evaluation, and painful retrenchment but innovation coordinated with both serendipitous and structured
circulation of ideas. This interaction fostered the adaptation of both successful
ideas and seemingly failed ones to new activities, leading to this essay’s fourth
observation: in many regards, material and intellectual connections mitigated
the uncertainty and risks of exploratory R&D—scientists moving among laboratories, engineers sharing building plans with industrial partners, researchers critiquing one another’s methods and consulting with operators. Among these communities, good ideas persisted and breakthroughs in fundamental knowledge
were disseminated. These circumstances could cast the concept of “R&D dead
end” in a new light. Indeed, neither Lawrence Sperry’s defunded guided bomb,
Hammond’s torpedo development, Mirick’s Wild Goose, nor even Fahrney’s
aspirations for a follow-on guided-missile program reached their intended
ends.68 Fourth, in the larger fields of radio, aviation, and naval tactics, these
seeming dead ends contributed to the successes of other platforms, programs,
and careers that were conducive to the U.S. victory in World War II. In an institutional setting of stability and intellectual latitude, as well as sustained receptivity
to testing, evaluation, and (re)training, ideas and hardware weathered periods
of uncertainty and were applied to entirely new projects, where they flourished.
Whereas in 1923 NRL conducted R&D with two in-house research divisions,
by the end of World War II the laboratory’s pool of expertise had expanded
considerably in scale and scope, but still featured many overlapping research
problems. Recalled Hoyt Taylor:
I can not [sic] close this account of the functions of the Radio Division without calling attention to the fact that many of our problems are linked with other Divisions
upon whom we may call freely for aid and assistance in solving our problems. In particular, the Division of Physical Optics has been of enormous assistance in the Wave
Propagation studies and naturally a very close connection exists between the Sound
Division and the Radio Division, many of whose problems almost overlap. The Divisions of Physical Chemistry and Metallurgy have also come frequently to the aid of
the Radio Division. The presence of these other Divisions is therefore of material aid
69
and assistance to the solution of radio problems peculiar to the Naval service.

By 2014, this, the Navy’s corporate research laboratory, employed more than
1,500 technical personnel in eighteen division-level organizations. It functions
today as a microcosm of the sciences, with a multeity seldom found within one
institution.
Whereas Ballentine and Mirick circulated among engineers, Navy radiomen,
radio physicists, and the service’s most capable pilots, these days drone R&D is
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more likely to bring together a plasma physicist and an expert in artificial intelligence. This change is, in part, a reflection of a broad and consistently expanding
sampling of the sciences available to the Navy in NRL, including the Nanotech
Institute, Tactical Electronic Warfare Division, Center for Biomolecular Science
and Engineering, and the Laboratory for Autonomous Systems Research, all
formed since 1923. But also, today’s work demands far more complicated inputs
for payloads and systems integration.
Vehicles of the twenty-first century operate in networks of ever-extending
reach. The notion of “remote control” takes on new meaning when drone operators and their aircraft are thousands of miles apart. In what has been described
as “remote split operation,” drone pilots often function in different cities, time
zones, or continents from their environments of interest. Autonomous systems,
robotics, distributed systems, UAVs, or remote split operation, call them what
you will—these capabilities bring with them many new complexities, in design,
management, and institutional jurisdiction. As researchers have sought a more
centralized forum to facilitate R&D, policy experts and a few military commanders have begun to question the curious lack of an arena for formal exchanges
concerning the development and operation of UAVs, and of robotics writ large.70
Proponents of such forums resist relying on chance. They are calling for more
sustainable and more widely reaching institutions to facilitate interorganizational
research, development, and testing to improve field operations. In 2007, thirtythree researchers representing five NRL divisions coauthored a report proposing
a joint task force to oversee the development and evaluation of weapons systems.71 Therein they argued that distributed autonomous systems of sensors—on
wing, land, and water—would prove themselves as interservice joint-task-force
assets for forward operational sensing, search and rescue, fleet and land mine
countermeasures, and antimissile defense.72 Significantly, the report suggested
that a tiered systems-development process would combine the skills of military
operators, academia, industry, and management and operational contract laboratories. These collaborators might contribute to a “red team” that would participate in developing and evaluating improved joint systems capabilities by taking
the perspective of potential adversaries and deliberately devising challenges.
No such red team was instituted. A few years later, in 2011, the chief of the
operations branch at the Joint and Army Experimentation Division observed that
there was still “no unified strategy or governance structure that moves away from
the stove-piped approach and integrates concept development, requirements,
and capabilities assessment.”73 Echoing to a degree Hooper’s HF concerns of a
hundred years earlier, that commentator wished not only to “prove with analytical rigor that robots are a preferred solution to address capability gaps” but to
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create a centralized forum for discussing the best possible operation of these new
systems, as well as their consequences.74
As our case studies lead us to expect, critical breakthroughs in complementary fields are indeed advancing the fields of drone R&D. To what degree will
today’s researchers, administrators, sponsors, and industrial partners leave such
variables to chance? Scientific and manufacturing innovations like improved
autopilot, smaller microprocessors, and lighter and more durable materials have
ushered in a renaissance for remotely piloted aerial vehicles, taking them well
beyond the form and function of the early twentieth century and arguably to the
point of “autonomy.” Miniaturization and mass production have helped reduce
costs to the point at which remotely piloted craft can be considered “expendable,”
even disposable. Many suggest this—a hundred years into drone testing and
development—is just the beginning of what the drone platform can offer when
integrated with other emerging systems: improved navigation, fuel cells, laser
communication, improved remote sensing, remote memory storage, and various
forms of countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures.
Fifth, the United States has never in fact been alone in the field of drone R&D.
Since at least the 1920s, radio researchers have benefited from inputs from abroad
(such as intelligence concerning German torpedoes or feedback from the British
Queen Bee proof-of-concept aircraft). More often, however, radio R&D has been
driven by military threats from abroad.75 Thus one of the “consequences,” mentioned above—that is, mass production and economies of scale are driving down
prices but in doing so are also dissolving barriers to entry by potential adversaries. Nine decades after the first “unpiloted” flight of Wild Goose, a host of new
battlefield threats face drone operators, commanders, and developers of Navy
equipment. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert,
has predicted that by 2025, radar, electro-optical sensors, and “precision-guided
weapons will be the norm among our adversaries and competitors—from terrorist groups to criminal organizations to our maritime peers.”76 This gradual convergence of technical capabilities aids nonstate actors, terrorists, and insurgents,
who pose sustained threats to foreign and domestic security.
Thus—sixth, and finally—as isolated technologies become available to adversaries, well-governed and effective networks among the armed services, intelligence community, and their diverse research-and-development communities
may prove the critical edge for the United States.
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